The 1987 Philippine Constitution was drafted after the 1986 People Power Revolution to establish democratic governance, political accountability, and social justice. This review evaluates how the Constitution’s institutional design and economic policy provisions affect political and economic outcomes amid ongoing governance challenges. Using an integrative qualitative literature review, this study synthesizes empirical, theoretical, and policy literature from diverse academic and institutional sources. Systematic search and thematic analysis examine the relationship between constitutional formal rules and informal political dynamics shaping governance and economic reforms. The Constitution enshrines checks and balances, decentralization, limits on foreign ownership, and anti-dynasty provisions. Despite these, elite dominance and patronage politics weaken their effectiveness. Economic policies intended to protect national sovereignty have created policy inflexibilities, restricting foreign investment and economic flexibility. Decentralization outcomes vary due to local elite capture. Current reform debates focus on economic liberalization and federalism but face resistance from entrenched political interests. The 1987 Constitution offers a robust democratic and economic framework, but entrenched political elites hinder full implementation of its goals. Successful reform efforts must address both institutional provisions and underlying political practices to improve accountability, institutional capacity, and inclusive development.

Keywords: constitutional political economy, institutional design, economic policy outcomes, literature review